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COMMENTS
THE BURDEN OF PROOF AS TO TESTAMENTARY
CAPACITY IN WISCONSIN
The phrase burden of proof is often heard in the practice of law,
but its meaning frequently seems to escape definition. Though it may
often be thought of as a theoretical concept of little practical value, it
may be of great advantage to the practitioner to know the exact meaning of the term. Different meanings may be given to the phrase, but
in this article an attempt will be made to make the different meanings
stand in sharp focus.
THE

Two

MEANINGS OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF-

ORTHODOX POSITION

Wigmore states that the phrase burden of proof is used in two
senses, the burden in the primary sense and the burden in the secondary
sense.' The burden of proof in the primary sense refers to the burden
placed upon one party to ultimately bear the risk of nonpersuasion
of the jury (or judge). 2 By the risk of nonpersuasion is meant the
necessity of convincing the jury (or judge) in the last instance of
the truth of one's contention. In an ordinary civil case, the judge
will instruct the jury that the party with the burden in the primary
sense has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
the truth of his allegations. The burden of proof in this, the primary
sense, never shifts.3
Wigmore also explains who generally has the burden of proof in
the primary sense. Logically and as a good general rule, the location
of the burden in the primary sense can be determined from the complaint. A party plaintiff will have the burden of proving the allegations
of his complaint. If the defendant has an affirmative defense, he must
prove his affirmative argument; he has the burden of proof on this
4

issue.

As opposed to this burden of proof which remains upon the same
party from the beginning to the end of the case, there is the burden in
the secondary sense. The burden in the secondary sense refers to the
burden of going forward with evidence to meet the evidence of the
opposite party or to establish a prima facie case.- Initially the burden
in the secondary sense is on the party with the risk of nonpersuasion
of the jury (burden in the primary sense), although he may be able to
meet this secondary burden through the aid of presumption. 6 If he
§2485 at 270, §2487 at 278 (3d ed. 1940).
§2485 at 278.
3 Id. §2489 at 285.
4 Id. §2487 at 279 and 282.
Id. at 279 and 281.
6Id. at 282-284.
1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE,

2 Id.
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produces evidence sufficient to make out a prima facie case, that is,
evidence which in the absence of contrary evidence is sufficient to go
to the jury, it is said that the burden shifts. The other party who
according to the general rule will be the defendant is now required to
meet the prima facie case of his opponent (who under our assumption
will be the plaintiff). He must meet this burden in the secondary
sense or risk having a verdict directed against himself. Once he has
met this burden it is often said that the burden shifts back again to
the party who originally had the burden in the secondary sense. But
Wigmore says that this is only true when the defendant introduces
evidence of such a nature that the evidence of the plaintiff is rendered
non-credible. In order to shift the burden the defendant must do more
than to equalize the evidence. If he introduces evidence which effectively destroys the plaintiff's prima facie case and if in the absence of
other evidence, a verdict would have to be directed against the plain7
tiff, then the burden will shift again.
It seems clear that the burden in the secondary sense refers, as
Wigmore says, to the procedure by which the judge controls the
evidence in requiring credible evidence for the jury's consideration
(or for his consideration if he is trying the case)." The burden in the
secondary sense thus is only for the judge's consideration. Once the
necessary prima facie case has been made and there is substantial
evidence upon which a reasonable jury could base a verdict, the jury
will be instructed that a certain party has the burden of convincing
them of the truth of his contention. But this, the burden in the primary sense, is not considered until the burden in the secondary sense
has been satisfied and the case is before the court or jury for final
consideration.
THE BURDEN OF PROOF AS TO TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY

As we have stated, the general rule is that the plaintiff has the
burden of proof in the primary sense as to the allegations of his complaint. At first glance, then, we might expect the proponent of a will
to have the burden of proving testamentary capacity. In many states
it seems that this is the case. Atkinson states that in the majority of
states the proponent of the will has the burden of proof in the primary
sense on the issue of testamentary capacity. 9 The burden is upon the
proponent since as part of his case for proving the will he must prove
that the testator had the necessary capacity to make it. The contestant
does not have the burden of proof, even though he alleges incapacity
as a ground for denial of probate. The proponent is aided in meeting
his burden by the presumption of sanity that exists in many states.10
7 Id. at 279.

8 Id. at 273.

9 ATKINSON, WILLS §101

'oId. at 546.

at 545 (2d ed. 1953).
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The rule is the same as to the due execution of the will; the proponent
must prove due execution." But the rule is different when the claim
of the contestant is that the testator was subject to undue influence.
Here Atkinson says that the general rule is that the burden in the
primary sense is upon the contestant. 12 This may be for the reason that
undue influence is a form of fraud which has always been regarded
as provable by the contestant. Perhaps too it is thought that the
contestant has a better chance of proving undue influence. But
whatever the reason, the burden as to mental capacity and the burden
as to undue influence have been treated differently by the courts and
so we might expect to find Wisconsin following along with the great
weight of authority.
In Will of Faulks13 the Wisconsin Supreme Court seems to adopt
the orthodox position in toto. The Court states with great vigor its
belief that the contestant has the burden of proof in the primary sense
on the question of undue influence. 4 The Court also explains Wigmore's definitions of the two meanings of the burden of proof and
seems to accept the orthodox position here also.' While bringing Wisconsin law into line with the majority position on the question of undue
influence, the Court also adds the dictum that the burden of proof in
the primary sense as to testamentary capacity is upon the proponent.' 6
This statement is clear and unambiguous, but unfortunately other
cases on the subject are not clear and unambiguous.
In the early case of Allen v.Griffin the Wisconsin Court stated:
...This Court has held and we think properly that in a case
where a will is contested on the ground that the deceased was
insane or otherwise incompetent to make a will at the time the
same was made, the burden of proof is on the contestant and
that the proponent need not in making out his side of the case,
make full proof of the capacity of the testator, but may content himself, by making out a prima facie case of capacity and
introduce his further proofs on that question after the contestant has made his proof. In a case which does not disclose
any facts which tend to show incompetency, slight evidence of
the competency of the testator is sufficient to put the contestant
to his proofs upon that question.'
11 Id. at 543.
12Id. at 549.
13 246 Wis. 319, 17 N.W. 2d 423 (1943).
1 246 Wis. at 358.
15 Id. at 345.
16 Id. at 357. The Court states "The burden of proof is upon the proponent to
establish by the fair preponderance and weight of the evidence that the instrument propounded is the genuine last will and testament of the deceased that
he was competent to make a will, and that it was duly executed and attested
with the requisite formalities .... This burden is upon the proponent to the
end of the trial. (Emphasis added.)
1769 Wis. 529 at 537, 35 N.W. 21 (1887).
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It is doubtful that the Supreme Court at the time of this case was
clearly aware of the distinction between burden of proof in the primary and in the secondary sense. In the first portion of the quote, the
Court imposes on the contestant a general burden of proof. But in the
succeeding portion, the Court requires the proponent to first introduce
some evidence to establish a prima facie case. Under the orthodox
view if the contestant has the burden in the primary sense, there is
no necessity for a prima facie case by the propenent. It seems probable
that the Court is speaking of what would now be considered the burden in the secondary sense and is imposing this burden on the contestant, at least after the prima facie case has been made by the
proponent.
After clearly stating the orthodox position by dictum in the Faulks
case, the Court seemed to go back to a more ambiguous discussion in
the fairly recent case of Estate of Bickner. The Court stated:
To bar the will of a testator requires proof and the burden of
proof rests with the contestant to show by clear, convincing,
and satisfactory evidence that the mind of the testator was deranged. The legal presumption is in favor of sanity and sufficient capacity to make a valid will and the burden of showing
such insanity or incapacity is upon the contestant.1 8
The Court seems to rely strongly upon Will of Emerson 9 but this
case gives no further illumination. Note well, however that the Court
seems to speak of a general burden of proof as in the Allen case, again
failing to define the term at all, but it does speak of the presumption
in favor of sanity which could be construed to mean that the burden
in the secondary sense is the burden the Court is referring to here.
Through our analysis of the old case of Allen v. Griffin and the
comparatively recent case of Estate of Bickner, it is possible to arrive
at a synthesis of the language of the two cases, expressing a possible
interpretation of the decisions which is not at variance with the dictum
in Will of Faulks. In the Allen case the Court is requiring slight
evidence in speaking of the necessity of the proponent introducing
some evidence to establish his prima facie case and thus shift the
burden in the secondary sense. In the more modern Bickner case the
presumption of sanity seems to have the effect of the slight evidence
referred to in the Allen case, and thus the presumption shifts the
burden in the secondary sense to the contestant. Then, however, the
contestant must introduce much stronger proofs (the clear and satisfactory evidence of the Bickner case) in order to shift the burden in
the secondary sense back to the proponent . But under both cases the
proponent must first introduce his proofs and this should mean that the
18

259 Wis. 425 at 433, 49 N.W. 2d 404 (1951).
Wis. 437 at 445, 198 N.W. 441 (1924).

19 183
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proponent has the burden of proof in the primary sense. In other
words, he ultimately has the risk of nonpersuasion of the jury or the
court, though he is aided by the strong character of the evidence
required of his opponent.

20

The most damaging cases from the viewpoint of one seking to find
some consistency in this area are Will of King and Will of Williams.
To add to the distress both of these cases were decided after the
Faulks case. In Will of King, the Court states:
Appellant relies on mental incapacity and undue influence to
defeat the will. On both issues he has the 2burden of proof by
clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. 1
Will of Williams 22 repeats the ominous words that on both issues
the contestant has the burden of proof. Obviously in the recent cases
the Court has tended to lump undue influence and mental incapacity
together. 23 Both, it seems, stand in the same position of disfavor.
In view of the fact that Will of Faulks made it abundantly clear that
when undue influence is pleaded, the burden in the primary sense is
upon the contestant, it seems difficult to reconcile the dictum of Will of
Faulks that the proponent has the burden in the primary sense to prove
mental competency with recent Wisconsin case law. Allen v. Griffin
Will of Cole, 49 Wis. 179, 5 N.W. 346 (1880) seems contra to this interpretation. The Court states: "The legal presumption is in favor of sanity and on
the issue of sanity or insanity the burden is upon him who asserts insanity
to prove it. Hence in a doubtful case, unless there appears a preponderance
of proof of mental unsoundness, the issue should be found the other way.
But in a later case the Court analyzes this case and seems to soften the
wording somewhat in Will of Silverthorn, 68 Wis. 372 at 379, 32 N.W. 287
(1887) . . . Affirmative proof is required to be made of the mental soundness
of the testator before the will can be admitted to probate, and that until such
affirmative proof is made there is no presumption of sanity, but when a
prima facie case of insanity is made by the proofs and some contestant makes
issue of sanity, the presumption of sanity arises, and the burden of proving
the testator of unsound mind is upon him who asserts it." The justice feels
that some proofs are needed to establish the presumption of sanity since the
Wisconsin Statutes at that time and today prescribe certain proofs for the
probate of uncontested wills. He seems to feel the same requirement is necessary for contested wills although the statute does not say so. Wis. STAT.
§310.06 (1957), reads: If no person shall contest the probate of a will the
court may grant probate thereof on the testimony of one of the subscribing
witnesses if such witness shall testify that such will was executed in all
particulars as required by the statutes and that the testator was of sound
mind at the time of the execution thereof. If no competent subscribing witness resides in this state at the time fixed for proving the will or if none
of them, after due diligence used, can be found in this state, the court may
admit the testimony of other witnesses to prove the sanity of the testator
and the execution of the will and may admit proof of his handwriting and
that of the subscribing witnesses. (Emphasis added.)
21 251 Wis. 269 at 273, 29 N.W. 2d 69 (1947).
22256 Wis. 338 at 345, 41 N.W. 2d 191 (1949).
23 Many other recent cases may be cited to illustrate how the Court has treated
undue influence and mental capacity in the same manner. Cf. Will of Delmady, 251 Wis. 48, 28 N.W. 2d 301 (1947); Estate of Sawall, 240 Wis. 265,
3 N.W. 2d 373 (1942) ; Will of McLeish, 209 Wis. 417, 245 N.W. 197 (1932);
In re Bauer's Estate, 264 Wis. 556, 59 N.W. 2d 481 (1953).
20
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and Estate of Bickner by one interpretation and a few other old cases
at least seem to lend support to the Faulks dictum.

24

However, it is

possible that because of the light burden that the proponent of a will
has, the Court looks only to burden in the secondary sense which seems
to be the important burden in these cases. If this is what the Court
means, then the Court's statement can be explained by the fact that
as soon as the proponent makes out a prima facie case the burden in
the secondary sense shifts to the contestant and from that time on the
burden of the contestant is, for practical purposes, the same on the
questions of undue influence and mental capacity.
ORIGIN AND EFFECT OF TIE PRESUMPTION OF SANITY

In Estate of Bickner the Court makes a statement which poses an
unanswered question for us. The Court states: "The legal presumption is in favor of sanity and sufficient legal capacity to make a valid
will, and the burden of showing such incapacity is upon the contestant."25 We have already stated that according to our interpretation
the presumption referred to here shifts the burden in the secondary
sense to the contestant and thus relieves the proponent of his burden in
the secondary sense. But another question remains unanswered-does
this presumption arise automatically without the introduction of any
&2 7
evidence. Both Estate of Bickner26 and Will of Szperka
upon which
Estate of Bickner seems to rely do not appear to require evidence to
raise the presumption of sanity, and in many states, and in Wisconsin
under some circumstances, no evidence is necessary to raise this presumption. 28 But Page says that evidence is necessary to raise this
presumption in Wisconsin will cases.2 9 Will of Silverthorn and Allen
v. Griffin seem to bear out his statement, saying in effect, that a slight
amount of evidence will be sufficient to give the proponent the benefit
of a presumption.

30

But these two cases are based upon an old Wisconsin Statute"
which requires testimony by the attesting witnesses to admit an uncontested will to probate. Since our present topic involves the burden of
proof as to sanity when a will is contested, it is not at all clear that
the statute is in point. Thus it sems possible that both Will of Silverthorn and Allen v. Griffin are based upon a statute which is inappli24 In

Will of Zych, 251 Wis. 108, 28 N.W. 2d 316 (1947), the Court makes a
statement which seems to place the burden in the primary sense upon the
proponent. "A will may be sustained in opposition to positive testimony of
one or more of the subscribing witnesses as to mental capacity if by the
preponderance of the evidence from other witnesses, proof is made that the
testator was of sound mind and there was a valid execution of the will."
25 259 Wis. 425 at 433, 49 N.W. 2d 404 (1951).
26 Ibid.
27 254 Wis. 153 at 158, 35 N.W. 2d 209 (1948).
28 2 PACE, WILLS, §771 at 503 (3d ed. 1941).
29 Id. at 504.
3068 Wis. 372 at 379, 39 N.W. 287 (1887) ; 69 Wis. 529 at 539, 35 N.W. 21 (1887).
31 §310.06 cited in note 20 supra.
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cable to the circumstances at hand. In fact later cases have omitted
mention of the statute and thus it might be inferred that the Court
has now adopted a position opposite to that stated in Will of Silverthorn. Even if the Court still holds to a statutory construction of
doubtful validity, the language of later cases seems to have definitely
modified the Court's formerly rigid position. It is not necessary to take
the statement of Estate of Bickner as implying that the presumption
of sanity arises without the introduction of evidence. Will of Szperka,
upon which it seems to rely, appears to illustrate quite clearly how
easily the presumption may arise; the mere presence of an attestation
clause in the will seems sufficient to raise a presumption of sanity.
The Court quotes Will of Hawkinson in saying:
Attestation is prima facie proof of the testator's authentic signature, his volition in3 3signing, and his mental capacity and understanding of his act.

Thus though Page's statement may be correct that the presumption
does not effectively arise by itself, still there is generally little practical
difficulty in raising the presumption if the attestation clause gives rise
3 4

to this important presumption.

As can be seen from the quote above, the Court now seems to
treat due execution and mental capacity in the same manner, with
regard to the presumptions arising from the attestation clause. This
was not always the case. Many early cases refer to the presumption
of due execution arising from the attestation clause, but fail to refer
to mental capacity at all.3 5 Will of Grant gives the general rule for the
presumption of due execution:
The recitals in the attestation clause show due execution of the
will, and there is a strong presumption of the truth of these
recitals which must prevail unless overcome by clear and
36
satisfactory evidence.
This case shows the degree of proof required to rebut this presumption; it must be clear and satisfactory. The fact that both Will
of Hawkinson and Will of Szperka seem to treat mental capacity
143 Wis. 136, 126 N.W. 683 (1910).
s The Court cites Corpus Juris, 68 C. J. Wills, §843 at 444 and American
Jurisprudence, Am. Jur. Wills, §891 at 98, but cites no Wisconsin authority. Thus the Court seems to ignore the Wisconsin authority which is
the basis for Page's statement. In this case and in all other recent cases, the
Court also fails to cite §310.06 supra note 20; from this it is possible to infer
that the Court no longer regards the statute as applicable when the will is
contested. Note also how Will of Zych, supra note 24, and the statement of
Page, infra note 37, allow the sustaining of a will against the claim of incapacity even though the attesting witnesses testify against the will. It seems
that today the statute can no longer be read literally in its requirement of
the testimony of the attesting witnesses to sustain the will.
35 Will of Lewis, 51 Wis. 101, 7 N.W. 829 (1881); Will of Maresh, 177 Wis.
194, 187 N.W. 1009 (1922); Gilmor's Will, 117 Wis. 302, 94 N.W. 32 (1903).
36 149 Wis. 330, 135 N.W. 833 (1912).
32
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and due execution in the same manner when there is an attestation
clause shows that a presumption of mental capacity arises from the
presence of an attestation clause in the will and leads this writer to
believe that the presumption can only be rebutted by clear and
satisfactory evidence. This opinion is further strengthened by the
above statement in Estate of Bickner to the effect that the presumption
is in favor of sanity and the burden is upon the contestant to prove by
clear and satisfactory evidence, incapacity.
To make the proponent's burden in the primary sense even lighter,
it does not seem necessary that the attestation clause contain any
assertions of mental capacity. In the Szperka case the Court also
makes the statement:
Attestation is prima facie proof of all facts essential to due
37
execution to which attesting witnesses could depose if present.
This statement does not seem to require any particular assertions
of mental capacity or of due execution to raise the presumptions. In
addition attempts by attorneys to draw inferences from the lack
of an assertion of mental competency in the attestation clause have
always drawn rebuffs from the Supreme Court.3 8 In Will of Enterson the contestant made the claim that because the attestation clause
did not contain an assertion of mental competency, an inference of
incompetency could be drawn. The Court rejected this thesis in
strong language:
The will contains the usual opening sentence, I Helen Emerson
being of sound and disposing mind and memory do hereby
make etc. We are not aware that it is customary to include in
the attestation clause any assertion of mental competence or the
lack of undue influence. Therefore the absence of both conveys
to our mind no suggestion of infirmity in the will. 9
Although it is true that the case does not refer to any presumption
of sanity flowing from the attestation clause, still the customary
assertion of mental competence by the testator, in the preamble, is
probably all that any court will require and an additional assertion of
competency in the attestation clause does not seem necessary.
37254

Wis. 153 at 158, 35 N.W. 2d 209 (1948). The Court also quotes a para-

graph from Page which seems to imply that the statements customarily made
in the attestation clause may be inferred if for some reason they may have been
omitted. "If the subscribing witnesses testify adversely to the capacity of
the testator, they have under oath stated that he was incompetent to make
a will, while by their solemn acts in subscribing as witnesses they have in
effect formally declared that he was competent. Accordingly their testimony
adverse to the capacity of the testator is, under such circumstances of but
little value. . . . Such evidence may be insufficient to overcome the presumption of sanity. 2 PAGE WILLs, 779 at 525 (3d ed. 1941). (Emphasis added.)
38 Will of Emerson, 183 Wis. 437 at 445, 198 N.W. 441 (1924); Loughney and
others v. Loughney, 87 Wis. 92 at 99, 58 N.W. 250 (1894).
39 Will of Emerson, 183 Wis. 437 at 445, 198 N.W.441 (1924).
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If the proponent is aided by a strong presumption arising merely
from the presence of an attestation clause in the will, his burden in the
primary and secondary senses is indeed a light one. His initial burden
in the secondary sense is met by the presumption and the burden is at
once shifted to the contestant. It is a burden which he cannot easily
shift since he must produce clear and satisfactory evidence to shift the
burden again in the secondary sense. The proponent's burden in the
primary sense is also easily discharged. The Court has required clear
and satisfactory evidence to rebut his prima facie case which is made
by the presumption arising from the presence of an attestation clause
in the will. It is clear that though he will probably wish to introduce
other evidence to bolster his contention of competency, his burden in
the primary sense is considerably lightened by the character of the
evidence the Court has required of his opponent - clear and satisfactory evidence. But though this does seem to be a possible explanation
of the case law, we have still the problem of the nature of the presumption which is the basis for our suggested interpretation. To
understand presumptions in general and presumptions in Wisconsin
with relation to our topic, we will now examine the theory of presumptions, according to Wigmore and according to Wisconsin case law.
THE THEORY OF PRESUMPTIONS GENERALLY

The generally accepted theory of presumptions is that of Wigmore
although Morgan and other eminent scholars have taken eloquent issue
with Wigmore's theory.40 The theory is however of venerable origin,
Wigmore having acquired it from Thayer. 41 It has been adopted by
the Model Code of Evidence and presumably by a majority of Ameri-

can jurisdictions. 42 Basically Wigmore states that a presumption is a
ruling as to the duty of producing evidence, having no evidentiary
force. 43 A presumption will relieve a plaintiff from the duty of making
out a prima facie case, (thus meeting his burden in the secondary
sense) but once the defendant introduces credible evidence upon which
a jury could base a verdict, the presumption is rebutted and drops out
of the case entirely. 44 As Wigmore says, a presumption only governs
the production of evidence ;that is its sole task. The question is often
Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 MICH. L.
REv. 195 at 210 (1953). Professor Laughlin cites many articles which have
criticized the Wigmore position. Among them are: Morgan, Further Observations on Presumptions, 16 S. CAL. L. REV. 245 (1943), Instructing the
Jury upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 HARV. L. REV. 59 (1933) ;

40Laughlin, In

Reaugh, Instructing the Jury upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 36
ILL. L. REV. 803 at 819 (1942); Helman, Presumptions, 22 CAN. B. REV. 118
(1944).
41 Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 MICH. L.
REV. 195 at 210 (1953).
42 Id. at 211.
43 9WIG1MORE, EVIDENCE, §2487 at 281 (3d ed. 1940).
44 Ibid.
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asked-what is left after the presumption disappears; the answer is
that an inference will generally remain upon which the presumption
was based and that after the presumption disappears, this inference
may still be strong enough to allow the plaintiff to go to the jury without introducing any more evidence than the evidence which originally
raised the presumption. 45 Most presumptions are based upon facts
which to reasonable people generally lead to certain conclusions.4
Thus the presumption of agency arising from the showing that an
employee was driving his employer's car during the hours of his employment may be rebutted but the inference of agency will still remain
and may be sufficient to allow the plaintiff to go to the jury without
4 7
introducing any additional evidence.
PRESUMPTIONS IN WISCONSIN

Having examined the majority view that the presumption drops
out of the case as soon as any credible evidence is introduced, we will
now examine the Wisconsin position. Raymond Geraldson writing in
the Wisconsin Law Review has examined the Wisconsin cases quite
carefully and seems to have found a curious division in Wisconsin
law.4 In one set of cases headed by the Spaulding case and by the
Faulks case the Wisconsin Court definitely espouses the Thayer-Wigmore doctrine that the introduction of any substantial evidence will
remove the presumption forever from the case. 49 However in Pringle
v. Dunn,50 the Court required clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence to rebut the presumption that a deed was duly acknowledged.
In later cases the Court has required the same degree of evidence to
rebut the presumption that a note was given for consideration, 5' that
the agency relationship did not exist at the time in question 52 and that
an attorney was authorized to perform customary legal acts. 5 In these
cases and in many others, Geraldson states, the Court has allowed the
presumption to affect the burden in the primary sense, a result clearly
45 Id. §2491 at 290.
46 Justice Holmes expresses it, perhaps in a better manner, in Greer v. United
States, 24 U.S. 559 at 561 (1917), "A presumption upon a matter of fact,
when it is not merely a disguise for some other principle, means that common experience shows the fact to be so generally true that courts may notice
the truth."
47245 Ala. 313, 16 S. 2d 720 at 724 (1944).
48 Geraldson, A Code of Evidence for Wisconsin, Presumptions and their Effect
1945 Wis. L. REv. 374 at 380-382.
4 Spaulding v. Chicago and North Western Railway Company, 33 Wis. 582
at 591 (1873), Will of Faulks, 246 Wis. 319 at 349, 17 N.W. 2d 423 (1943).
In the latter case the Court states: "When some evidence to the contrary is
received, that is evidence which if uncontradicted is sufficient to support a
finding, the presumption is destroyed or removed, it then has no probative
force. The matter is then to be determined upon all the facts freed from the
presumption."
50 37 Wis. 449 at 459 (1875).
51 Estate of Flierl, 225 Wis. 493 at 499, 274 N.W. 422 (1937).
52 Enea v. Pfister, 180 Wis. 329 at 332, 191 N.W. 565 (1923).
53 Mullins v. La Bahn, 244 Wis. 76 at 79, 11 N.W. 2d 519 (1943).
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contrary to the Wigmore doctrine.5 4 To understand how the presumption actually affects the risk of nonpersuasion, we must consider the
effect of this presumption on the instructions to the jury. Taking for
an example the presumption of the regularity of an attorney's acts,
the jury will be instructed that the plaintiff has the burden of proving
regularity of action, but that the plaintiff is aided by a presumption
of the regularity of an attorney's acts and that the defendant must
rebut this presumption by clear and satisfactory evidence. Thus the
plaintiff can meet his burden in the primary sense on the strength of
his presumption alone whereas the defendant is forced to introduce
clear and satisfactory evidence to rebut the presumption and the jury
will be instructed on the nature of the presumption as well as on the
character of the evidence required to rebut it. As we have stated
previously, the question of whether a burden in the secondary sense
has been met is never submitted to a jury, but here the jury is asked
to decide whether a presumption has been rebutted, normally a question of whether the burden in the secondary sense has been met."
Geraldson seems to feel that this type of instruction places a primary
burden upon the defendant which is the only true primary burden in
the case. He seems especially disturbed by the admixture of Morgan
and Wigmore, since, he aserts, the presumption in Wisconsin in certain
cases like that above is given the weight of evidence (if it doesn't drop
out of the case at the introduction of credible evidence it has the weight
of evidence), and in other cases like Will of Faulks, the Court specifically states that a presumption never has the weight of evidence."
Now that we have discovered that strong presumptions do not drop
out of the case in Wisconsin even though credible evidence has been
introduced, we can set out the theoretical and practical effects of the
particular presumption we are considering, the presumption of sanity
arising from the attestation clause. The proponent has the burden of
proving testamentary capacity in the primary sense. He is, however,
54 Geraldson, A Code of Evidence for Wisconsin, Presumptions and their effect,
1945 Wis. L. REv. 374 at 382, 26 MARQ. L. REv. 115 at 122 (1942).
55 McCormick, who generally agrees with Morgan, has this to say about this
practice of charging the jury that a presumption must be overcome by a
certain quantum of evidence. "Accordingly the custom has persisted in many
states, with surprisingly tough resistance to the criticisms of the text-writers,
of charging the jury as to certain presumptions having a substantial backing
of probability that the presumption stands until overcome in the jury's mind
of a preponderance of evidence to the contrary. In other words, the presumption is a "working hypothesis" which works by shifting the burden to
the party against whom it operates of satisfying the jury that the presumed
inference is untrue. This often gives a more satisfactory apportionment of
the burden of persuasion on a particular issue than can be given by the
general rule that the pleader has the burden. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE 671-672
(1954). Note that McCormick unlike Wigmore has no fear of the presumption's affecting the burden of persuasion. This is about as satisfactory an
explanation of the effect of this type of strong presumption as can be given.
56 Geraldson, A Code of Evidence for Wisconsin, Presumptions and their effect, 1945 Wis. L. REv. 374 at 382.
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aided by a presumption of sanity arising from the presence of an
attestation clause in the will. This presumption meets his burden in the
secondary sense which initially rests upon him. The burden shifts to
the contestant with the showing of an attestation clause in the will; his
burden is a heavy one since he must rebut the proponent's prima facie
case by clear and satisfactory evidence. It is unlikely that he will be
able to shift the burden in the secondary sense to the proponent, since
far more than credible evidence must be introduced to shift this burden.
Theoretically the proponent will have the burden of persuading the
judge in the last instance that the testator was sane.57 But assuming
that the prima facie case has been made by the proponent, the contestant must first show by clear and satisfactory evidence that the
testator was insane. He must rebut the presumption of sanity by clear
and satisfactory evidence, theoretically, a secondary burden. In fact
the contestant will have a burden very similar to the burden in the
primary sense. He must present clear and satisfactory evidence to
rebut the presumption of competence and the proponent need only
stand upon his presumption. Practically speaking, the proponent
would not rely solely upon his presumption, but theoretically, at least,
this seems all that the Court is requiring him to do. In reality the
proponent's burden in the primary sense is a burden in name only.
In the last analysis the judge must decide whether the presumption
has been rebutted. If it has, then the proponent has not met his burden,
but if the presumption has not been rebutted he has met his burden in
the primary sense and thus has proved his case.
CONCLUSION

In most states, the burden in the primary sense to prove testamentary capacity is upon the proponent of the will." Atkinson says that
this is logical since mental competence is one of the first requirements
for a valid will.59 In many states, it is true, the proponent is aided by
a presumption of sanity, but as soon as credible evidence is introduced
the presumption disappears. In these states the proponent has a practical as well as a theoretical burden. In Wisconsin the burden of the
proponent seems to be purely theoretical. The strong character of the
presumption of sanity in Wisconsin will cases is to a great extent
responsible for the light primary burden of the proponent. Although
there may be good policy reasons for giving the presumption of sanity
in Wisconsin a special force, confusion is engendered by the fact that
judge is the trier of fact on the question of mental capacity and a jury verdict is merely advisory. However, since an advisory
verdict may be desired, it is important to know how the jury should be instructed. See Loughney v. Loughney, 87 Wis. 92 at 101, 58 N.W. 250 (1894).
See also cases cited there.
58 ATKINSON, WILLS, §101 at 545-546 (2d ed. 1953). Note in 6 Miss. L. Joua. 403
(1934).
59 Id. at 548 and 403.
57 In Wisconsin the
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it does not seem to have this special force in other areas outside the
field of will contests.6" There is also displayed in the case law a great
variety of opinion on the location of the burden of proof as to testamentary capacity in will contests. As can be seen much of the language
of these cases is difficult to reconcile. It is the belief then of the writer
that some clarification of the case law in line with the Faulks dictum
would aid the profession greatly in reconciling the cases in this area.
ROBERT G. ULRICH

60 See Guardianship of Farr, 169 Wis. 451 at 454, 171 N.W. 951 (1919) in which
the Court states that a finding of insanity by a court will refute the presumption of sanity. No special type of evidence seems required to rebut the
presumption.

